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I. INTRODUCTION 
In State v. Colosimo, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that an 
expectation of privacy does not exist in a boat or other conveyance 
typically used to transport fish and it is therefore permissible for an 
armed conservation officer to conduct a nonconsensual inspection 
of the boat or other conveyance.1  In making its decision, the court 
relied upon Minnesota Statutes section 97A.251, subdivision 1(3), 
 
       †   Ed Butterfoss and Joseph Daly are professors of Law at Hamline 
University School of Law, St. Paul, Minnesota.  They represented John Colosimo in 
his petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.  The authors 
wish to thank Michele Satterlund, a third year student at Hamline Law School, for 
her assistance and hard work. 
 1. State v. Colosimo, 669 N.W.2d 1, 9 (Minn. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 
2017 (2004). 
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which provides that a person may not “refuse to allow inspection of 
a motor vehicle, boat or other conveyance used while taking or 
transporting wild animals.”2 
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision authorizes searches 
of individuals absent any suspicion of criminal behavior or behavior 
in violation of state fishing regulations.3  By eliminating any 
requirement of suspicion of wrongdoing, the court allows searches 
based on an armed conservation officer’s whim, rather than a 
suspicion that an individual has engaged in conduct that violates 
Minnesota’s fishing and hunting laws.4  The decision permits 
searches based solely on a suspicion that an individual has been 
engaged in the lawful activity of fishing and/or transporting fish,5 
opening the door to searches at the unbridled discretion of 
individual officers. 
The court’s decision is inconsistent with the Fourth 
Amendment prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures6 
and with the court’s own recent decision in State v. Larsen,7 which 
prohibited the search of a fish house by an officer who lacked 
probable cause.  Additionally, in State v. Henning,8 the court “took a 
firm stance in favor of the ‘reasonable articulable suspicion’ 
standard . . . [and] made it clear that constitutional rules apply 
even during stops of vehicles with special series plates . . . issued 
chiefly to repeat drunken drivers.”9 
This article examines the various opinions in the Colosimo case, 
including the opinion of the Minnesota Court of Appeals (which 
was reversed by the supreme court), as well as the majority, 
concurring, and dissenting opinions of the supreme court.10  The 
article provides a brief background of how the issue of stops and 
inspections by conservation officers has been dealt with in other 
jurisdictions11 before turning to a critique of the Minnesota 
 
 2. MINN. STAT. § 97A.251 subd. 1(3) (2000) (including fish in the definition 
of wild animal). 
 3. Colosimo, 669 N.W.2d at 9. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 7. 650 N.W.2d 144, 153–54 (Minn. 2002). 
 8. 666 N.W.2d 379 (Minn. 2003). 
 9. Piper Kenney Webb & Bruce H. Hanley, Scarlet Letters: Traffic Stops Based 
on ‘Special’ License Plates Must Follow The Letter of The Constitution—State v. Henning, 
30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 513, 528 (2003) (citing Henning, 666 N.W.2d 379). 
 10. See infra Parts III, IV. 
 11. See infra Part V.A. 
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Supreme Court’s decision in Colosimo, which the authors consider 
far too expansive.12  The decision in Colosimo undermines the right 
of citizens of Minnesota to be free from invasions of privacy at the 
unbridled discretion of officers in the field.  The court historically 
has recognized and protected this right, but Colosimo, to paraphrase 
the court in Henning, represents “a dramatic departure that 
demotes constitutional protections to a position inferior to that of 
fishing regulations.”13 
 




On the morning of September 18, 2000, John Colosimo was 
ending a fishing trip with a law school friend and the friend’s two 
adult children on Rainy Lake at Kettle Falls in Voyageurs National 
Park.14  The group had stowed their personal belongings and 
suitcases on Colosimo’s open bowed boat in order to make the trip 
back to the far shore of Lake Namakan where they had left their 
vehicles.15 
The Crestliner boat, owned by Colosimo, was being trailered 
by a truck owned by a National Park licensee along the National 
Park roadway between Rainy Lake and Namakan Lake.16  As the 
truck and trailered boat made a loop on the National Park roadway 
to allow the driver to back the trailer and boat into the water of 
Namakan Lake, the occupants of the boat observed another 
unmarked boat tied by its bow to the dock adjacent to the boat 
ramp.17  It was a boat used by the Department of Natural 
Resources.18  Once the truck operator had stopped the truck to 
unhook the Crestliner, Officer Lloyd Stein, a uniformed Minnesota 
Department of Resources officer, walked toward the truck.19  He 
struck up a conversation with Colosimo, who was sitting at the 
 
 12. See infra Part V.B. 
 13. Henning, 666 N.W.2d at 386. 
 14. State v. Colosimo, 669 N.W.2d 1, 2 (Minn. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 
2017 (2004). 
 15. Id.; John M. Colosimo Aff. ¶ 3 (on file with author). 
 16. See John M. Colosimo Aff. ¶ 3 (on file with author). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Colosimo, 669 N.W.2d at 3. 
 19. Id. 
3
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steering wheel of his boat.20 
Officer Stein asked Colosimo if his group had caught any fish, 
and Colosimo responded that they had caught some.21  Colosimo 
told Stein that they were in a hurry to go because of mechanical 
problems with his friend’s new boat.22  Stein asked how many fish 
the group had caught.23  Colosimo responded that they had not 
been fishing that day and had less then their limit.24  Stein asked 
how they had the fish packaged, and Colosimo responded they had 
gutted and gilled the fish according to the regulations affecting 
Rainy Lake.25  Stein asked if he could take a look at the fish.26  
Colosimo inquired as to why they were being questioned and asked 
Stein several times what his basis was for searching and inspecting 
the fish, what his probable cause was, and whether he had a search 
warrant.27  Colosimo told Stein he would agree to a search if the 
officer could articulate legitimate and valid reasons to search the 
boat.28 
Officer Stein stated that he didn’t need a reason as long as he 
knew there were fish on the boat.29  When Colosimo refused 
inspection, the conservation officer issued Colosimo a ticket for 
failing to allow an inspection of his boat pursuant to Minnesota 
Statutes section 97A.251, subdivision 1(3).30 
B. Procedural History 
The State and Mr. Colosimo agreed to a bench trial, and the 
district court found Colosimo guilty of refusal to allow inspection of 
 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. John M. Colosimo Aff. ¶ 2 (on file with author). 
 23. Colosimo, 669 N.W.2d at 3. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. State v. Colosimo, 648 N.W.2d 271, 272 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002), rev’d, 669 
N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 2003), cert denied, 124 S. Ct. 2017 (2004). 
 29. Id.  Colosimo did not have any improperly obtained fish on the boat.  The 
fish on the boat had been obtained pursuant to proper permits and gutted and 
gilled according to regulation.  Colosimo was not attempting to hide incriminating 
evidence from the conservation officer.  Colosimo’s refusal was based on the fact 
that Officer Stein did not have a search warrant and did not provide Colosimo 
with probable cause for searching the boat and inspecting the fish.  See John M. 
Colosimo Aff. (on file with author). 
 30. Colosimo, 648 N.W.2d at 272. 
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a boat under Minnesota Statutes section 97A.251, subdivision 
1(3).31  He was assessed a fine of $100.00 plus a $37.00 surcharge.32  
Colosimo appealed the conviction to the Minnesota Court of 
Appeals.  The court of appeals, in an opinion authored by now 
Justice Sam Hanson,33 reversed the district court.34  The court of 
appeals concluded that in order to inspect Colosimo’s boat the 
officer must have probable cause of a violation of a fish or game 
law.35  The court further held that a boat owner’s refusal to allow an 
inspection does not provide probable cause to believe the owner 
has incriminating evidence of fish violations on the boat.36 
The State appealed the case to the Minnesota Supreme Court.  
The supreme court reversed the court of appeals, holding that 
Colosimo had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the areas of 
his open boat or other conveyance used to typically store or 
transport fish.37  The court held that it was permissible for the 
conservation officer to conduct a nonconsensual inspection of the 
area of Colosimo’s open boat, including areas where fish are 
typically stored or transported.38  The court found that by refusing 
to submit to the officer’s request to inspect all these areas of his 
open boat, Colosimo had violated Minnesota Statutes section 
97A.251, subdivision 1(3).39  Following the Minnesota Supreme 
Court decision, a petition for writ of certiorari was made to the 
United States Supreme Court.  The writ was denied on April 19, 
2004.40 
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION 
The court of appeals first addressed “whether the state must 
prove, as a predicate to the crime of refusal to allow inspection, 
that the [conservation] officer had probable cause to request the 
 
 31. Id. 
 32. Colosimo, 669 N.W.2d at 3. 
 33. Justice Hanson was later appointed to the Minnesota Supreme Court, but 
based on his participation in the decision of the court of appeals, he recused 
himself when the Supreme Court heard the case. 
 34. Colosimo, 648 N.W.2d 271. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Colosimo, 669 N.W.2d at 6. 
 38. Id. at 9. 
 39. Id. at 8. 
 40. Colosimo v. Minnesota, 124 S. Ct. 2017 (2004). 
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inspection.”41  Although Minnesota Statutes section 97A.251 does 
not expressly include that requirement, the court concluded that 
“it must be implied because of constitutional and other statutory 
requirements.”42 
The court noted that the “Minnesota Supreme Court has 
consistently held that the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against 
unreasonable searches and seizures applies to searches made by 
conservation officers.”43  The court of appeals also stated that a 
“conservation officer violate[s] the Fourth Amendment when he 
enter[s] . . . [a] fish house without consent, a warrant, probable 
cause or any articulable basis for suspicion.”44  The court concluded 
that a person in an automobile has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy, and saw no reason to distinguish between an automobile 
and a boat.45  According to the court this was especially true in 
Colosimo, where the boat was towed by a motor vehicle, further 
blurring any distinction between a vehicle and a boat.46  Under the 
Fourth Amendment—assuming there is no distinction between a 
boat and a motor vehicle—a conservation officer is required to 
have probable cause that a crime has been committed in order to 
justify a search of a boat without the owner’s consent.47  That being 
so, the court posed the question whether “the legislature [could] 
constitutionally require a person to consent to a warrantless search 
of protected property without probable cause, or make it a crime 
for a person to refuse such consent?”48  Although the narrow 
wording of the statute appeared to require such consent,49 the 
court concluded that in order to be consistent with the 
constitution, it must read the statute to include an implied 
predicate that the officer have probable cause to support a request 
for inspection.50 
The court supported its conclusion by pointing to a related 
statute, which states, “[w]hen an enforcement officer has probable 
cause to believe that wild animals taken or possessed in violation of 
 
 41. Colosimo, 648 N.W.2d at 273. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. (citing State v. Krenz, 634 N.W.2d 231, 234 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001)). 
 45. Id. at 274. 
 46. Id. at 274 n.1. 
 47. See id. at 274. 
 48. Id. 
 49. MINN. STAT. § 97A.251, subd. 1(3) (2000). 
 50. Colosimo, 648 N.W.2d at 274. 
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game and fish laws are present, the officer may: (1) enter and 
inspect any place or vehicle; and (2) open and inspect any package 
or container.”51  By construing the provisions of the crime of refusal 
to allow inspection together with the probable cause limitations 
placed on the officer’s authority to inspect, the court concluded 
that a boat owner could not be convicted of the crime of refusing 
an inspection unless the state could prove the officer had probable 
cause to request the inspection. 
The appellate court also rejected the state’s contention that 
probable cause was not required for an inspection because of the 
“regulated activity exception” to the Fourth Amendment.52  The 
court pointed to State v. Krenz, which held that warrantless searches 
conducted to enforce regulatory schemes are only enforceable in 
the context of a pervasively regulated business activity, not a 
personal recreational activity.53  Just as Krenz rejected the 
application of the exception to a fish house used for personal 
recreational purposes, the Colosimo court ruled that “unless a 
person is using a boat for a pervasively regulated business activity, 
probable cause is required to enter and inspect a boat.”54  The 
court acknowledged “the difficulty a conservation officer faces in 
acquiring probable cause for fishing violations that are committed 
essentially in private,” but emphasized that the difficulty of finding 
probable cause does not override constitutional protections or 
statutory limitations.55  Further, the court could not conclude that 
“the legislature had clearly expressed an intent to prefer the 
enforcement of the fish laws to individual privacy rights.”56 
The court cited State v. Greyeagle, which held that a statute 
regulating the issuance of special series license plates to cars 
registered to convicted DUI offenders (or members of their 
household) did not expressly authorize vehicle stops based solely 
on the license plates.57 Additionally, a driver who displays special 
series license plates does not give implied consent to stop the 
vehicle on which the plates are displayed, absent reasonable 
 
 51. Id. at 276. 
 52. Id. at 275. 
 53. Id. (citing State v. Krenz, 634 N.W.2d 231, 236–37 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001)). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. (citing State v. Greyeagle, 541 N.W.2d 326, 328 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1995)). 
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suspicion independent of the special plates.58  Only after the 
legislature amended the statute to provide specific authorization 
for stops based solely on the plates did the court of appeals 
construe the statute to establish a driver’s implied consent without 
independent suspicion.59  The Colosimo court contrasted that 
situation with Minnesota Statutes section 97A.215, which 
“conditions the officer’s inspection authority to situations where 
the officer has ‘probable cause.’”60 
The final issue the appellate court decided was whether 
Colosimo’s refusal to allow an inspection, together with the 
officer’s knowledge that fish were in the boat, gave the officer 
probable cause to believe Colosimo had violated fishing laws.61  The 
court held that Colosimo’s refusal did not give the conservation 
officer probable cause to believe Colosimo had incriminating 
evidence on the boat because the Fourth Amendment provides “‘a 
constitutional right to refuse to consent to entry and search,’ where 
the officer lacks probable cause,”62 and because passive refusal 
cannot be a crime, nor be used as evidence of a crime.63  The court 
observed to hold otherwise would effectively eliminate the 
requirement of probable cause because an officer could avoid the 
requirement by simply requesting inspection: if the boat owner 
refused, the officer could use the refusal as probable cause.64  The 
appellate court concluded that because the conservation officer 
admitted he did not have probable cause when he initially 
approached the boat and Colosimo’s refusal could not provide 
probable cause, Colosimo could not be convicted for refusing to 
allow inspection.65 
 
 58. Greyeagle, 541 N.W.2d at 330. 
 59. Colosimo, 648 N.W.2d at 275–76 (citing State v. Henning, 644 N.W.2d 500, 
503 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002), rev’d, 666 N.W.2d 379 (Minn. 2003)).  See also, infra 
notes 177–87 and accompanying text. 
 60. 648 N.W.2d at 276. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. (quoting United States v. Prescott, 581 F.2d 1343, 1350–51 (9th Cir. 
1978)). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
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IV. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION 
A. The Majority Opinion 
On appeal to the Minnesota Supreme Court, Colosimo argued 
that the Department of Natural Resources officer “stopped” his 
fishing party without reasonable suspicion in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment.66  He further argued that because the officer 
did not have probable cause to inspect his boat, the officer’s 
request to do so was unlawful and Colosimo could not be convicted 
for his refusal to permit the inspection.67  Colosimo relied on 
Delaware v. Prouse, which held that the Fourth Amendment 
prohibits random and suspicionless stops of drivers.68 
The majority began its analysis by determining that the 
conservation officer’s approach and subsequent questioning of 
Colosimo about the group’s fishing activities did not constitute a 
“stop” under the Fourth Amendment, an issue the court of appeals 
had expressly declined to address because it was not necessary to its 
decision.69  The supreme court pointed out that the conservation 
officer had simply conversed with Colosimo while the boat was at a 
standstill prior to its entering the lake.70  This, the court reasoned, 
presented a situation distinctly different from that of Prouse, where 
a patrol officer stopped a moving automobile without cause.71  The 
court relied on previous cases holding that generally no seizure 
occurs when an officer approaches and asks questions of a person 
standing on a public street or sitting in a parked car.72  The court 
acknowledged that a seizure eventually took place, but concluded 
that, by that point, Colosimo had admitted to fishing and 
transporting fish but refused to allow an inspection, thus giving the 
conservation officer the suspicion required under the Fourth 
 
 66. State v. Colosimo, 669 N.W.2d 1, 3-4 (Minn. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 
2017 (2004). 
 67. See id. at 3-5. 
 68. Id. at 4 (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979)). 
 69. See Colosimo, 648 N.W.2d at 276. 
 70. Colosimo, 669 N.W.2d at 3. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. (citing In re Matter of Welfare of E.D.J, 502 N.W.2d 779, 782 (Minn. 
1993); State v. Vohnoutka, 292 N.W.2d 756 (Minn. 1980)).  On the issue of 
difficulty in determining when a seizure occurs, see generally Edwin J. Butterfoss, 
Bright Line Seizures: The Need For Clarity In Determining When Fourth Amendment 
Activity Begins, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 437 (1988). 
9
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Amendment.73 
The court then considered whether the conservation officer 
had the authority to search Colosimo’s open boat to inspect fish 
once Colosimo had admitted to transporting fish.74  The issue 
turned on whether, under the circumstances, Colosimo had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.75  If not, the Fourth 
Amendment’s prohibition on “unreasonable searches” would not 
be implicated and his conviction for refusing to allow the search 
would be lawful.76  The court framed the issue as a question 
“whether there are any areas of Colosimo’s boat where an 
expectation of privacy was not reasonable . . . .”77 
To determine whether Colosimo’s expectation of privacy was 
reasonable, the court considered the nature of recreational fishing, 
the characteristics of an open boat, and the fact that the request 
occurred in open season near game fish habitat.78  The court 
described recreational fishing as a highly regulated and licensed 
privilege that imposes strict conditions on those who choose to 
participate in the sport.79  One of those conditions, the court 
concluded, is allowing conservation officers to inspect boats or 
other conveyances used to transport fish.80 
The court found guidance in the Montana Supreme Court 
decision in State v. Boyer.81  Boyer held that a fisherman had no 
legitimate expectation of privacy in the rear platform of his boat, 
and held that a park warden could legally step on the transom of 
the boat to inspect fish contained in the live well.82  The court in 
Boyer explained: 
In engaging in this highly regulated activity, anglers must 
assume the burdens of the sport as well as its benefits.  
Thus, no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy 
exists when a wildlife enforcement officer checks for 
 
 73. Colosimo, 669 N.W.2d at 3.  Of course, that admission by Colosimo was not 
an admission of wrongdoing or behavior in violation of fishing regulations.  Thus, 
the court ultimately authorized a seizure and search without suspicion of any 
wrongdoing. 
 74. Id. at 4. 
 75. Id. at 5. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. 42 P.3d 771 (Mont. 2002). 
 82. Id. at 779. 
10
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hunting and fishing licenses in open season near a game 
habitat, inquires about game taken, and requests to 
inspect game in the field.  In this capacity, game wardens 
are acting not only as law enforcement officers, but as 
public trustees protecting and conserving Montana’s 
wildlife and habitat for all its citizens.83 
The Minnesota Supreme Court noted the important role 
fishing plays in the lives of many Minnesotans and the need for 
regulations to protect the state’s natural resources.84  The court 
concluded that the citizens of Minnesota understand the need for 
effective regulation, as evidenced by the fact that they have adopted 
an amendment to the Minnesota Constitution which states, 
“Hunting and fishing and the taking of game and fish are a valued 
part of our heritage that shall be forever preserved for the people 
and shall be managed by law and regulation for the public good.”85  
This provision, the court concluded, recognizes the link between 
the enforcement of fishing regulations and the preservation of 
Minnesota’s game and fish resources.86 
The court noted that when anglers purchase fishing licenses, 
they routinely receive pamphlets relating to fishing limitations and 
regulations.87  This information, together with the “widespread 
knowledge of the restrictions accompanying the privilege of fishing 
casts doubt on the reasonableness of an expectation of privacy that 
would allow an angler to refuse inspection of his catch.  Those who 
. . . harvest Minnesota’s natural game are on notice . . . [and] are 
subject to regulations.”88  Thus, the court reasoned, Colosimo, who 
was at a known fishing destination, acknowledged he had been 
fishing, and admitted to transporting his catch in an open boat 
“had no reasonable expectation of privacy [in] the areas of his 
open boat or other conveyance used to typically store or transport 
fish . . . .”89 
The court supported its reasoning by citing other courts 
around the country that have reached similar conclusions when 
analyzing searches of individuals who choose to take game.90  They 
 
 83. Id. at 776. 
 84. Colosimo, 669 N.W.2d at 6. 
 85. Id. (citing MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 12). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
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noted that in People v. Perez, the California Court of Appeals held 
that “the high degree of regulation over the privilege of hunting, in 
turn, reduces a hunter’s reasonable expectation of privacy.”91  In 
Hamilton v. Myers, the Sixth Circuit held that “[e]veryone who 
participates in the privilege of hunting has a duty to permit 
inspections to determine whether they are complying with 
applicable laws.”92  And the South Dakota Supreme Court in State v. 
Halverson held that “[s]ince it is a privilege to hunt wild game, a 
hunter tacitly consents to the inspection of any game animal in his 
possession when he makes application for and receives a hunting 
license.”93  In citing these cases, the Minnesota Supreme Court did 
not address the dissent’s arguments that these cases involved either 
searches that occurred in plain view—as opposed to the closed 
containers in Colosimo’s case—or checkpoint searches, which are 
not permissible under the Minnesota Constitution.94 
The court also insisted that its decision was consistent with 
State v. Larsen, which recognized citizens’ expectation of privacy in 
a fish house and prohibited the search of a fish house without 
probable cause.95  A fish house, the court observed, is a “home-like 
dwelling”96 that provides “privacy for activities ‘recognized and 
permitted by society,’”97 and “the minimal intrusion involved [with 
inspecting fish on a boat] . . . is markedly less than that occurring 
[in a] . . . fish house.”98  The court explained that any other 
conclusion “would prevent the state from meeting its constitutional 
mandate [to] manage and regulate fishing to preserve [the state’s] 
natural resources” because “the state would only be able to inspect 
boats when it [had] observe[d] or ha[d] information from a 
‘confidential reliable informant’ on the actual catching and 
keeping of fish in excess of the applicable limits, size, season, or 
species.”99  To the court, “[t]he idea that officers would be required 
to personally witness illegal catch activity, coupled with the reality 
that fishing can take hours or even days, illustrates how absurd it 
 
 91. Id. (quoting People v. Perez, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 596, 601 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1996)). 
 92. 281 F.3d 520, 532 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 93. 277 N.W.2d 723, 724–25 (S.D. 1979). 
 94. Colosimo, 669 N.W.2d at 12 nn.3–4. 
 95. Id. at 6–7 (citing State v. Larsen, 650 N.W.2d 144 (Minn. 2002)). 
 96. Id. at 7. 
 97. Id. (quoting Larsen, 650 N.W.2d at 149). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
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would be to recognize a privacy interest inherent in an angler’s 
take and only then have probable cause to inspect.”100 
To support its argument, the court again pointed to the 
reasoning of the Montana Supreme Court in State v. Boyer.101  Boyer 
recognized that “Montana’s vast geography, the angler’s somewhat 
uninhibited freedom of movement, and remoteness from warrant-
issuing magistrates and law enforcement entities would severely 
impede game violation investigations,” leading to the “depletion of 
Montana’s wildlife and fish.”102  The Colosimo court compared 
Minnesota’s more than 10,000 lakes and numerous streams and 
rivers to Montana’s rugged geography and concluded that 
Minnesota’s anglers’ “largely uninhibited freedom of movement in 
remote areas in pursuit of . . . abundant fish” similarly impeded 
game violation investigations in Minnesota, putting the state’s 
natural resources at risk.103  Having determined that the Fourth 
Amendment did not prohibit a limited inspection of Colosimo’s 
boat, the court lastly turned to the issue of whether the statute 
under which Colosimo was convicted required probable cause in 
order to undertake a search.104 
The Minnesota Supreme Court disagreed with the court of 
appeals’ interpretation of the statute, which required proof, “as a 
predicate to the crime of refusal to allow inspection,” that an 
officer have probable cause to suspect a violation.105  The supreme 
court relied on the plain wording of the statute and declined “to 
interject a probable cause requirement into [section] 97A.251 
merely because the legislature in [section] 97A.215[, subdivision] 
1(b)(1) granted conservation officers with probable cause the 
authority to ‘enter and inspect any place or vehicle.’”106 
In conclusion, the court stressed that their decision did “not 
grant conservation officers power beyond that of other law 
enforcement officers.”107  Rather, the court argued, “the difference 
between the inspection permitted under the facts of this case and 
searches impermissible under the Fourth Amendment is that 
fishing is a largely recreational privilege that anglers choose to 
 
 100. Id. 
 101. 42 P.3d 771 (Mont. 2002). 
 102. Colosimo, 669 N.W.2d at 7 (quoting Boyer, 42 P.3d at 776). 
 103. Id. at 8. 
 104. Id. (referring to MINN. STAT. § 97A.251, subd. 1(3) (2000)). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 9 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 97A.215, subd. 1(b)(1)). 
 107. Id. 
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engage in with knowledge of the regulations governing their 
conduct.”108  The decision, the court reasoned, “merely 
acknowledges that an expectation of privacy in all parts of an open 
boat or other conveyance used to transport fish is not 
reasonable.”109  As such, the court concluded that “it was 
permissible for the conservation officer to conduct a 
nonconsensual inspection of the areas of Colosimo’s open boat 
typically used to store or transport fish,” and by failing to submit to 
the officer’s lawful request, Colosimo violated Minnesota Statutes 
section 97A.251, subdivision 1(3).110 
B. Justice Page’s Dissenting Opinion 
Justice Page, in his dissent, decried the loss of the historic 
protection for an individual’s right to be free from unreasonable 
searches: “Today’s sweeping decision holding that there is no 
expectation of privacy in areas of an open boat where fish are 
typically stored overturns recent precedent and eviscerates the 
constitutional protection against unreasonable searches.”111 
Justice Page’s dissent begins with the acknowledgment that, as 
a general rule, a state has the power to grant or deny a privilege as 
the state sees fit.112  However, Justice Page pointed out, the power of 
the state is not unlimited and it may not impose conditions that 
require the relinquishment of constitutional rights.113  The 
majority’s decision in Colosimo, Justice Page argued, “permits 
precisely that which the Supreme Court in Frost prohibited”—
imposing a condition on the privilege of taking wildlife, which 
infringes on constitutional rights.114  As a result, Justice Page argued 
that the court has subjected Minnesota’s citizens to searches at the 
whim of individual officers: 
By concluding that one who engages in the regulated 
activity of fishing has no expectation of privacy in the 
areas of an open boat or other conveyance used to 
 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 9 (Page, J., dissenting). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 9–10 (“[T]he state may not impose upon the permission to take 
wildlife the condition that the state be allowed to invade the constitutional rights 
of the individual.”). 
 114. Id. at 10 (referring to Frost v. R.R. Comm’n, 271 U.S. 583 (1926)). 
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typically transport or store fish, the court ensures that 
every such search will be reasonable, even when based on 
a conservation officer’s whim, thereby making a warrant 
based on probable cause unnecessary.  In the end, 
because no such warrantless searches will be violative of 
the Fourth Amendment’s and article I, section 10’s, 
protections against unreasonable searches, individuals 
engaging in or who are believed to have engaged in 
hunting or fishing will be subject to searches otherwise 
constitutionally forbidden.115 
According to Justice Page, the erosion of citizens’ protection is 
exacerbated by the court’s refusal to define or explain what 
constitutes an area “of an open boat or other conveyance used to 
typically store or transport fish.”116  Justice Page conceded that “to 
the extent a boat is open and items are in plain view, there is no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in those items because the 
individual has not sought to keep them private.”117  The problem, 
he pointed out, “is that the court extends this rationale to any place 
on the boat where fish are typically stored and to items not in plain 
view.”118  He explained, “[t]he expansive language in the opinion 
makes it apparent that a peace officer . . . will be able to search not 
only open boats, but any boat, car, or truck on the mere hunch that 
the occupants have engaged in the regulated activity of hunting or 
fishing.”119  In failing to define these areas, Justice Page argued, the 
court opened the door to searches of packages and containers on a 
boat that contains items an individual is seeking to keep private.120 
Justice Page rejected the court’s conclusion that Colosimo had 
no expectation of privacy because recreational fishing is a privilege 
and subject to extensive regulation.121  He argued that the court’s 
reliance on People v. Perez122 and State v. Halverson123 is misplaced, 
since those cases involved searches that arose out of game 
checkpoints, a law enforcement procedure that is impermissible 
under the Minnesota Constitution.124  Further, he noted that the 
 
 115. Id. (citation omitted). 
 116. Id. at 10 n.1. 
 117. Id. at 12 n.3. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 10 n.1. 
 120. Id. at 12 n.3. 
 121. Id. at 9–18. 
 122. 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 596 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). 
 123. 277 N.W.2d 723 (S.D. 1979). 
 124. Colosimo, 669 N.W.2d at 12 (Page, J., dissenting). 
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court in Larsen concluded that fishing is not comparable to 
“running an automobile junkyard business, operating a licensed 
gun dealership, or engaging in the sale of alcoholic beverages for 
the purpose of the closely regulated industry exception.”125  Larsen 
recognized that the state’s fish and game rules were no more 
comprehensive than the state’s traffic rules, and concluded that the 
state’s interest in protecting and regulating wildlife and natural 
resources was less than its interest in deterring drunk driving.126  
Therefore, a fishing boat—particularly one not in the water—at a 
minimum is entitled to the same protection as an automobile.  “If, 
in the face of extensive regulation, the search of a vehicle may ‘not 
be initiated without at least a reasonable articulable suspicion of 
unlawful conduct,’ then the search of a fishing boat should not be 
treated any differently.”127 
As to the statute under which Colosimo was convicted, Justice 
Page asserted that the presumption that the legislature did not 
intend an absurd or unreasonable result, and that the legislature 
intended the entire statute to be effective and certain, compels a 
different result.128  Here, Minnesota Statutes section 97A.251, 
subdivision 1(3), provides that a person may not “refuse to allow 
inspection of a motor vehicle, boat, or other conveyance used while 
taking or transporting wild animals.”129  However, Minnesota 
Statutes section 97A.215, subdivision 1(b), authorizes conservation 
officers to “enter and inspect any place or vehicle” and to “open 
and inspect any package or container” only when the officer “has 
probable cause to believe that wild animals taken or possessed in 
violation of the game and fish laws are present.”130  Although the 
majority refused to impose a probable cause requirement on the 
inspections for which citizens can be punished for refusing “merely 
because” the legislature required officers to have probable cause 
before carrying out the inspection, Justice Page contended that 
reading the provisions together compels the conclusion that a 
citizen need only accede to an invitation if the officer has the 
authority to inspect—that is, probable cause.131  The majority’s 
 
 125. Id. (quoting State v. Larsen, 650 N.W.2d 144, 152–53 (Minn. 2002)). 
 126. Id. at 13; see Larsen, 650 N.W.2d at 153. 
 127. Colosimo, 669 N.W.2d at 13 (quoting Larsen, 650 N.W.2d at 153). 
 128. Id. at 16. 
 129. MINN. STAT. § 97A.251, subd. 1(3) (2000). 
 130. Id. § 97A.251 subd. 1(b). 
 131. Colosimo, 669 N.W.2d at 16. 
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interpretation produces an absurd result.  “The enforcement 
officer cannot conduct an inspection without probable cause,” but 
a person can be criminally penalized for refusing to allow an 
inspection that the enforcement officer had no authority to 
conduct in the first place.132 
Justice Page acknowledged that a probable cause requirement 
will make it more difficult to detect fishing violations, but noted, 
“as we concluded in Larsen, the ‘ease in enforcing the law has never 
been a sufficient justification for government intrusion.’”133  In 
addition, although the majority claimed that a probable cause 
requirement “would prevent the state from meeting its 
constitutional mandate that it manage and regulate fishing to 
preserve our natural resources,” the State offered no evidence to 
show that this was the only effective enforcement measure.134  In 
fact, the State conceded that requiring conservation officers to 
comply with the constitutional requirements of probable cause 
“does not pose any kind of direct threat to fish, per se,” and the 
“resource itself can be protected even if individual harvest 
behaviors cannot be regulated.”135  Justice Page contended that 
“[w]ithout empirical evidence to the contrary, there is no way to 
reach the conclusion that the random seizure of an individual on 
the mere belief that the individual has engaged in . . . fishing or 
gaming is . . . an effective [or justifiable] means of promoting 
resource preservation.”136 
Justice Page was also concerned that the court, rather than 
requiring the state to properly manage Minnesota’s wildlife 
resources, “has instead decided to grant the state the power to 
compel the relinquishment of an individual’s constitutional right 
not only to be free from unreasonable searches, but also the 
freedom to assert one’s constitutional right without fear of criminal 
punishment.”137 
He was worried that the court’s decision holding that there is 
no expectation of privacy in areas of an open boat where fish are 
typically stored overturns recent precedent and eviscerates the 
constitutional protection against unreasonable searches: 
 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 17 (quoting Larsen, 650 N.W.2d at 150 n.5). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 17–18. 
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Because both conservation officers and police officers are 
bound as peace officers by the same constitutional 
constraints, the court’s decision has now opened the door 
for warrantless searches by any peace officer upon the 
mere suspicion that an individual is, has been, or will in 
the future engage in hunting or fishing.  As the Court said 
in Frost, “It is inconceivable that guaranties embedded in 
the Constitution . . . may thus be manipulated out of 
existence.”138 
C. Justice Paul Anderson’s Concurrence and Dissent 
Justice Paul Anderson concurred with the majority’s 
conclusion that the conservation officer had the right to inspect 
the open sections of Colosimo’s fishing boat and that Colosimo 
prevented the conservation officer from doing so.139  Justice 
Anderson argued, however, that the court’s analysis went beyond 
what was necessary by granting the officer the right to inspect “any 
other conveyance” used to transport fish.140  He agreed with the 
majority that Colosimo, as an angler in a stopped, open boat who 
admitted to fishing, had no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the open section of his boat, even though it would be intrusive to 
some degree to have an officer look in his boat.141  His concern was 
that the majority’s express holding that the officer could also 
search “any other conveyance” used to transport fish was overly 
broad, unnecessary, and inadvisable.142  He noted that because the 
conservation officer in Colosimo was prevented from any search, it 
is unknown what “other conveyance,” if any, the conservation 
officer sought to inspect.143  The court’s vague holding that 
conveyances “used to typically store or transport fish” are subject to 
search makes it difficult to ascertain with any degree of certainty 
what other conveyances are subject to search.144  Presumably 
because “other conveyances” potentially includes areas with 
significant expectations of privacy, Justice Anderson would have left 
the resolution of what a conservation officer has the right to 
 
 138. Id. at 18 (quoting Frost v. R.R. Comm’n, 271 U.S. 583, 593–94 (1926)). 
 139. Id. (Anderson, Paul, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 19. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
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inspect beyond the open sections of a fisherman’s boat for another 
day.145 
V. ANALYSIS 
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s holding that there is no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the areas of an open boat or 
other conveyance typically used to transport fish, making such 
areas subject to inspection without individualized suspicion, is 
contrary to the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.  Although the privilege of 
fishing is important, the rights of citizenship are vital, and a 
constitutional right must outweigh a broad, unlimited right of 
inspection by an officer.  No citizen should be criminally punished 
for refusing to consent to an unrestrained, suspicionless search. 
A. Background 
In his concurring opinion in Delaware v. Prouse, Justice 
Blackmun emphasized that in his view the case did not address the 
constitutionality of “the necessarily somewhat individualized and 
perhaps largely random examinations by game wardens in the 
performance of their duties.”146  Since then, although never 
addressed by the United States Supreme Court, numerous state 
and lower federal courts have addressed the issue.  Generally, these 
courts have recognized the important government interest in 
protecting the natural resources of their respective states, but they 
have imposed limits on the actions of game wardens in order to 
protect citizens from indiscriminate searches and seizures 
undertaken at the whim of individual officers. 
Several courts have permitted searches or seizures if the officer 
has reasonable suspicion that a violation of fish and game laws has 
occurred.  For example, in People v. Coca, the Colorado Supreme 
Court required reasonable suspicion of illegal behavior before 
stopping a vehicle.147  In Hill v. State, the Florida Supreme Court 
permitted an officer to board a ship to view a shrimping permit, 
but required probable cause of a violation before an inspection of 
the boat could take place.148  The Illinois Court of Appeals, in People 
 
 145. Id. 
 146. 440 U.S. 648, 664 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 147. 829 P.2d 385 (Colo. 1992). 
 148. 238 So.2d 608 (Fla. 1970). 
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v. Levens, held that a motorist may only be stopped if an officer has 
reasonable suspicion that the motorist is presently engaged in 
illegal hunting.149  Also, the New Mexico Court of Appeals in State v. 
Creech150 and the West Virginia Supreme Court in State v. Legg151 
both held that reasonable suspicion was required for a stop by a 
conservation officer. 
A few courts, however, have permitted suspicionless stops and 
searches.  In State v. Keehner, the Iowa Supreme Court permitted 
stops of vehicles of individuals “engaged in an activity which may be 
reasonably interpreted as ‘hunting.’”152  And the Sixth Circuit in 
Hamilton v. Myers upheld the right of game wardens to make 
inspections and conduct searches without warrants when it is clear 
that someone has been hunting.153 
Consistent with Prouse, several courts have permitted 
suspicionless searches only if a scheme is in place to limit the 
discretion of the officer in the field.  In People v. Perez, the 
California Court of Appeals allowed the use of traffic checkpoints 
near hunting areas during hunting season in order to inspect 
licenses, tags, equipment and any wildlife taken.154  Similarly, the 
South Dakota Supreme Court in State v. Halverson,155 and the 
Mississippi Supreme Court in Drane v. State,156 upheld checkpoints 
used in search of wildlife and game violations. 
B. An Overly Broad Rule 
By holding that Colosimo did not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the “areas of an open boat or other 
conveyance used to typically store or transport fish”157 and thus 
could be criminally punished for refusing to permit inspection, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court improperly stripped Colosimo of a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. This placed an impermissible 
burden on the right to assert one’s constitutional rights without 
 
 149. 713 N.E.2d 1275 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999). 
 150. 806 P.2d 1080 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991). 
 151. 536 S.E.2d 110 (W. Va. 2000). 
 152. 425 N.W.2d 41, 45 (Iowa 1988). 
 153. 281 F.3d 520 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 154. 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 596, 601 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). 
 155. 277 N.W.2d 723 (S.D. 1979). 
 156. 493 So. 2d 294 (Miss. 1986). 
 157. State v. Colosimo, 669 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Minn. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 
2017 (2004). 
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fear of criminal punishment. 
The United States Supreme Court has consistently recognized 
that citizens enjoy an expectation of privacy in containers found 
within a vehicle.  In United States v. Ross, the Court concluded that 
“the Fourth Amendment provides protection to the owner of every 
container that conceals its contents from plain view.”158  In 
upholding a suspicionless boarding of a vessel in waters providing 
access to the open sea in United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, the 
Court emphasized the fact that “[n]either the [vessel] nor its 
occupants are searched, and visual inspection of the [vessel] is 
limited to what can be seen without a search.”159 
To the extent that a boat is open and items are in plain view, 
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in those items 
because the individual has not sought to keep them private.  The 
problem with the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in Colosimo 
is that its holding extends to any place where fish are typically 
stored, including those items not in plain view.  The Minnesota 
Supreme Court did not specifically delineate the limits of a legal 
search of an open boat, but nevertheless permitted a search of 
areas used “to typically store or transport fish.”160  This necessarily 
includes those areas not in plain view and presumably includes 
containers, which are often used to transport fish.161  In fact, in the 
Colosimo case, Colosimo told the conservation officer that the party 
was transporting fish “gutted and gilled . . . in accordance with the 
regulations affecting Rainy Lake.”162  Thus the fish were likely to be 
found in closed containers.  By permitting suspicionless searches of 
closed containers, the Minnesota Supreme Court expanded the 
authority of conservation officers beyond justification.  The court’s 
holding in this regard exceeds the holding and rationale of State v. 
Boyer,163 a case on which the court so heavily relied. 
In Boyer, the Montana Supreme Court was careful to justify the 
seizure of defendant as based on reasonable suspicion that an 
 
 158. 456 U.S. 798, 822–23 (1982) (citing Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 
(1981)). 
 159. 462 U.S. 579, 592 (1983) (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 
U.S. 543, 558 (1976); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925)). 
 160. Colosimo, 669 N.W.2d at 6. 
 161. The majority cited to Webster’s International Dictionary which defined 
“conveyance” as “[a] means of carrying or transporting something.” Id. at 8 n.2 
(citing WEBSTER’S INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 499 (3d ed. 1993)). 
 162. Id. at 3. 
 163. State v. Boyer, 42 P.3d 771 (Mont. 2002). 
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offense had occurred, noting that “[i]t is the presence of 
reasonable suspicion that allowed [the game warden] to proceed 
with the investigative stop.”164  The Montana court was further 
careful to limit the intrusion onto the boat to the transom, an area 
it equated to the bumper of a vehicle, in which the court found the 
defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy.165  Finally, the 
Montana court justified the officer looking into the live well as 
plain view.  The court emphasized the importance of the fact that 
the officer “did not conduct a search of the boat, look under the 
seats, remove or rearrange any personal belongings, or even open 
the top of the live well.”166 
The Minnesota Supreme Court, however, failed to recognize 
the importance of this limitation.  In the court’s view, because at 
least some portion of the boat was subject to search, Colosimo was 
guilty of a crime by refusing any search.  But how was Colosimo to 
know the search demanded by the conservation officer would be 
limited to lawful areas?  There was no search warrant describing the 
places to be searched; there were no administrative regulations or 
guidelines in place to limit the search; and, under the court’s 
ruling, probable cause did not limit or define the scope of the 
search.  The limit the court articulated in its opinion—areas of the 
open boat typically used to store or transport fish—was created by 
the court and was not in place at the time of the demand to search 
that led to Colosimo’s criminal conviction. 
Mr. Colosimo was faced with a demand for a broad, unlimited 
search of the trailered boat in which he was traveling and the 
containers on that boat, and was criminally punished for refusing 
to consent to such a search.  This is precisely the type of 
“standardless and unconstrained discretion” by the officer in the 
field that the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect against 
and that Delaware v. Prouse sought to prevent.167  If Minnesota seeks 
to utilize suspicionless searches to enforce its hunting and fishing 
laws, the Fourth Amendment at a minimum requires that such 
searches be appropriately limited by statute, regulation, or 
administrative policy. 
 
 164. Id. at 777. 
 165. Id. at 778. 
 166. Id. at 780. 
 167. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979) (citing Almeida-Sanchez v. 
United States, 413 U.S. 266, 270 (1973); Camara v. Mun. Ct. of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 
532–33 (1967)). 
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C. The Balance Between Environmental and Individual Rights 
Fishing plays an important role in the lives of many Minnesota 
citizens.  With its 10,000 lakes and plentiful streams and rivers, 
Minnesota is a haven of natural resources for sport fishing 
enthusiasts.  The State, to ensure the protection of this natural 
resource, created statutes and regulations that limit certain aspects 
of the sport, such as quantity, season, species, location, and size.  
These regulations help protect the resource so it can be enjoyed by 
countless generations to come. 
In its attempt to protect the state’s natural resources, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court has issued a decision that goes far 
beyond commonly recognized regulations and violates the Fourth 
Amendment’s guarantee of freedom from unreasonable searches 
and seizures.  The court’s decision that boats used in fishing are 
subject to indiscriminate searches at the whim of conservation 
officers is contrary to decisions of the United States Supreme Court 
and contradicts the Minnesota Supreme Court’s own recent 
precedent.  In State v. Larsen, the Minnesota Supreme Court held 
that a fish house, although not a substitute for a private dwelling, 
provides citizens with a reasonable expectation of privacy.168  The 
fish house, the court reasoned, protected its occupants from the 
elements and often provided eating, sleeping, and other facilities, 
thus providing privacy for activities “recognized and permitted by 
society” as important activities of a personal nature.169 
In Colosimo, the court justified its decision not to provide 
citizens in boats the same protection as occupants of a fish house 
because “the minimal intrusion involved here is markedly less than 
that occurring when the privacy of the private, home-like dwelling 
of a fish house is invaded.”170  Putting aside the difficult questions 
the court will face when a conservation officer attempts to search a 
houseboat he believes may contain fish, the court’s conclusion that 
the state’s interest in regulating fishing outweighs the intrusion 
involved in the search of a boat is difficult to square with the 
previous treatment it has accorded motor vehicles.  Perhaps a fish 
house deserves greater protection than a boat, but why should 
citizens in a boat (or in a car pulling a boat) receive less protection 
 
 168. 650 N.W.2d 144, 149 (Minn. 2002). 
 169. Id. 
 170. State v. Colosimo, 669 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Minn. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 
2017 (2004). 
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than citizens in a car? 
In Larsen, the court asserted that the state’s fish and game 
rules and regulations were “no more pervasive or comprehensive 
than the state’s traffic rules and regulations.”171  It concluded that 
the state’s interest in protecting and regulating wildlife was less 
than its interest in deterring drunk driving, which previous cases 
had concluded did not outweigh the privacy expectations of a 
motor vehicle occupant.172  That being the case, it is anomalous 
that, according to the Colosimo court, the state’s interest in 
protecting and regulating wildlife outweighs the privacy 
expectations of the occupant of a boat. 
In Ascher v. Commissioner of Public Safety, the court exercised its 
independent authority to interpret the Minnesota Constitution to 
strike down the use of roadblocks to stop all vehicles at sobriety 
checkpoints.173  The court pointed out that it “ha[d] long held 
[that Minnesota Constitution article I, section 10] generally 
requires the police to have an objective individualized articulable 
suspicion of criminal wrongdoing before subjecting a driver to an 
investigative stop.”174  Because the court believed the state had 
failed to articulate a persuasive reason for dispensing with the 
requirement of individualized suspicion, the court concluded that 
“the constitutional balance must be struck in favor of protecting 
the traveling public from even the ‘minimally intrusive’ seizures 
which occur at a sobriety checkpoint.”175  That being so, the 
constitutional balance must be struck in favor of protecting boat 
occupants from the intrusion of a search—even one characterized 
as a “minimal intrusion”—if the countervailing state interest is 
protection and regulation of fish and wildlife, which the court has 
found less weighty than the interest in deterring drunk driving. 
In State v. Henning, the court again protected occupants of cars 
when faced with the issue of whether police could stop individuals 
based solely on the basis of special series license plates issued for 
cars registered to individuals (or members of their household) 
whose license has been revoked as a result of DUI convictions.176  
 
 171. Larsen, 650 N.W.2d at 153. 
 172. Id. (relying on Ascher v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 519 N.W.2d 183 (Minn. 
1994)). 
 173. 519 N.W.2d 183. 
 174. Id. at 187. 
 175. Id. 
 176. 666 N.W.2d 379 (Minn. 2003). 
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The court relied on Delaware v. Prouse for the proposition that 
where individualized suspicion is not required to make a stop, 
other safeguards must be present to assure that a driver’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy is not invaded at the unbridled 
discretion of a patrolling officer.177  The court complained that the 
statute at issue in Henning “seeks to eliminate the constitutional 
safeguard requiring an officer to have reasonable articulable 
suspicion of criminal activity before stopping a motorist, but 
provides no substitute to protect licensed motorists . . . from 
repeated stops at the unchecked discretion of law enforcement 
officers.”178  Of course, the statute empowering conservation 
officers to conduct a search in Colosimo arguably did impose such a 
limit: it required conservation officers to have probable cause to 
search.179  However, the Minnesota Supreme Court read this 
limitation out of the statute, leaving anglers with nothing to protect 
them from repeated searches at the unchecked discretion of 
conservation officers. 
The Henning court was concerned that permitting stops based 
solely on the special series plates would subject innocent citizens180 
“to the possibility of numerous stops made each and every day” and 
to the possibility “of being stopped by every law enforcement 
officer they encounter.”181  Anglers in the state of Minnesota, and 
even non-anglers who happen to be in the area of fishing lakes, are 
now subject to the possibility of being searched by every 
conservation officer they encounter because the court in Colosimo 
did not see fit to provide the protection for them that the court 
provides motorists.  The only reason to not provide this protection 
was a perceived need to protect the natural resources of the state.  
It is hard to understand how the need to protect fish is greater than 
the need to protect human life, which was found insufficient to 
overcome the privacy interests of motorists in Ascher and Henning. 
The Colosimo court attempted to further support its decision by 
pointing to the difficulty of finding probable cause that a fishing 
 
 177. Henning, 666 N.W.2d at 383 (citing Delaware v. Prouse 440 U.S. 648, 653-
54 (1979)). 
 178. Id. at 385. 
 179. See MINN. STAT. § 97A.215, subd. 1(b) (2000). 
 180. Even if the convicted offender was driving, he might be doing so lawfully 
within the limits of a limited license, or a member of his household might lawfully 
be driving the car with the special series plates. 
 181. Henning, 666 N.W.2d at 384. 
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violation occurred on a boat.182  The court found it unreasonable to 
require an officer to track anglers’ “largely uninhibited freedom of 
movement in remote areas in pursuit of our abundant fish 
resources” in order to gain probable cause to inspect.183  However, 
the court failed to acknowledge that “difficulty” has never in the 
past been a basis for overriding constitutional requirements of 
individualized suspicion.  In Henning, the court recognized that the 
state has an obvious and substantial interest in safeguarding our 
roads from drivers who repeatedly drive while impaired.184  
Nevertheless, when faced with the argument that the suspicionless 
stops were necessary to protect this interest, the court answered: 
“We have never before simply allowed the ends to justify the means 
when the means void our citizens’ constitutional protections.”185  
Arguably, in Colosimo, the court has now done just that.  In Henning, 
the court went on to declare that permitting suspicionless stops 
“would be a dramatic departure that demotes constitutional 
protections to a position inferior to that of traffic safeguards.”186  In 
Colosimo, the court has demoted constitutional protections to a 
position inferior to that of fish and game regulations. 
The Colosimo court, however, attempted to differentiate Ascher 
from the case before it by again pointing to the level of intrusion.  
The court stated that the intrusion suffered by Colosimo, whose boat 
was already stopped when the officer began questioning him, 
“[did] not raise similar concerns of a ‘roadblock’ addressed in 
Ascher, where a large number of motor vehicles were stopped on 
the public highways . . . .”187  The court comfortably differentiated 
between suspicionless searches of boats and stops of vehicles, which 
require reasonable articulable suspicion, by focusing on the 
“recreational privilege that anglers choose to engage in with 
knowledge of the regulations governing their conduct.”188  But both 
boats and vehicles are heavily regulated.  Both require the use of 
public property and those who operate both are granted the 
“privilege” to do so by acquiring a license from the state.  
 
 182. State v. Colosimo, 669 N.W.2d 1, 6-8 (Minn. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 
2017 (2004). 
 183. Id. at 8. 
 184. Henning, 666 N.W.2d at 386. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Colosimo, 669 N.W.2d at 8 n.1 (citing Ascher v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 519 
N.W.2d 183, 187 (Minn. 1994)). 
 188. Id. at 9. 
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Moreover, like the fish house in Larsen, both boats and vehicles at 
one time or another may be utilized to shield the occupants from 
the elements and “provid[e] privacy for activities ‘recognized and 
permitted by society.’”189  The Colosimo court also took comfort in 
the fact that it only authorized searches, not stops.190  But whether 
that limitation holds when the court is presented with a case raising 
the issue of a stop by a conservation officer remains to be seen.  In 
any event, the court’s distinction will provide little comfort to 
citizens if conservation officers may, as the court permitted in 
Colosimo, take advantage of the situation whenever a citizen stops 
his boat or vehicle in order to enter a lake. 
John Colosimo was an innocent angler whose catch was in 
strict accordance with all of the state’s regulations.  Yet, despite 
Colosimo’s innocence, he was punished for asserting his Fourth 
Amendment rights against an officer who had no probable cause or 
even a hint of suspicion that any fishing rules had been violated.  
This is a violation of Colosimo’s constitutional rights, and is 
contrary to Minnesota Statutes section 97A.215, subdivision 1(b), 
which clearly states that an enforcement officer must have probable 
cause that a game or fish law violation has occurred before the 
officer enters or inspects any place or vehicle.191  By finding John 
Colosimo in violation, the court in essence said that a citizen 
automobile driver has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his or 
her vehicle, while the boater who innocently spends a day on the 
lake is left with no protection and is subject to the indiscriminate 
whims of a conservation officer. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In Henning, Larsen, and Ascher, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
“took a firm stance in favor of the ‘reasonable articulable suspicion’ 
standard.”192  After Henning, commentators in this law review 
praised the court, stating “[t]he Minnesota Supreme Court’s firm 
position that suspicionless stops of motorists are improper can be 
cast in terms heard frequently at the United States Supreme Court 
during Chief Justice Earl Warren’s reign: the ends do not justify the 
 
 189. State v. Larsen, 650 N.W.2d 144, 149 (Minn. 2002) (quoting Minn. v. 
Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998)). 
 190. Colosimo, 669 N.W.2d at 8 n.1. 
 191. MINN. STAT. § 97A.215, subd. 1(b) (2000). 
 192. See Webb & Hanley, supra note 9, at 528 (referring to the court’s decision 
in Henning). 
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means.”193  That makes the court’s decision in Colosimo all the more 
surprising because it turns directly against this “firm stance,” and, 
in Justice Page’s words, “turns our court’s search and seizure law on 
its head.”194 
With the court’s decision in Colosimo, Minnesota’s citizens may 
now be criminally punished for refusing to submit to suspicionless 
searches and seizures of their motor vehicles, boats, or the other 
conveyances they use to typically store and transport fish.  The 
citizens of the State of Minnesota deserve better.  The court’s 
decision forces the state’s citizens to choose between their 
constitutional rights to be free from unreasonable searches and 
their “privilege” to engage in the hunting and fishing sports for 
which Minnesota is renowned. 
It is unfortunate that the United States Supreme Court did not 
grant certiorari to address the question whether a conservation 
officer is subject to the same rules and limitations as other law 
enforcement.  It is even more unfortunate that in the absence of a 
ruling from the United States Supreme Court, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court, a court which has regularly provided citizens with 
greater protection than required under the federal constitution, 
has subjected the state’s anglers to the standardless and 
unconstrained discretion of officers in the field which was 
condemned in Delaware v. Prouse.  With its decision in Colosimo, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court has left Minnesota’s citizens 
unprotected; any innocent angler, trapper, or hunter—or citizen 
thought to be an angler, trapper, or hunter—is subject to a 
demand to search at the whim of the state’s conservation officers 
and may be criminally punished if they do not comply.  As Justice 
Page so eloquently stated in his dissent: 
Rather than requiring the state to properly manage Minnesota’s 
wildlife resources, the court has instead decided to grant the 
state the power to compel the relinquishment of an individual’s 
constitutional right not only to be free from unreasonable 
searches, but also the freedom to assert one’s constitutional 
right without fear of criminal punishment.195 
 
 193. Id. at 526. 
 194. Colosimo, 669 N.W.2d at 13 (Page, J., dissenting). 
 195. Id. at 17–18. 
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